Policy Summary

Decision
EU funding blocked for energy projects using inverters and PCS from high-risk countries
High-risk countries
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea
Effective date
May 1, 2026
Legal basis
Commission guidance under existing EU Financial Regulation (not new legislation)
Scope
Solar, wind, and energy storage — PCS explicitly included
Financial instruments
All EU funding instruments, direct and indirect — including the European Investment Bank (EIB), European Investment Fund (EIF), and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
New financing
EUR 2 billion EIB renewable energy envelope under these restrictions
Status
In effect. No formal regulation published — guidance communicated internally to financial institutions

What Happened

On May 1, 2026, the European Commission implemented a ban on EU funding for renewable energy projects using inverters from countries designated as high-risk: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

The decision was quietly approved in March 2026 at a meeting of Commission President von der Leyen’s 26 department chiefs, as first reported by the South China Morning Post on April 14. The Commission did not issue a public press release. Instead, it communicated the policy directly to EU financial institutions and confirmed it only when pressed at a media briefing.

At the Commission Midday Briefing on May 4, Spokesperson Siobhan McGarry laid out the threat assessment that drove the decision:

"Our risk assessments have confirmed those threats, including manipulation of electricity production parameters, the disruption of electricity generation, and even unauthorized access to operational data. So in practice, this could mean a shutdown, a remote shutdown of member states' networks leading to countrywide blackouts."
— Siobhan McGarry, European Commission Spokesperson, May 4, 2026 (EC Midday Briefing)

McGarry confirmed the Commission decided to act ahead of legislation:

"In the medium term, the Cybersecurity Act will offer the possibility to ban the use of inverters from high-risk suppliers in the EU market but, nevertheless, we decided that we would take concrete action right now. And so that has included developing guidance on restricting the use of EU funds for projects involving inverters from high-risk suppliers."

At the same briefing, Commission official Thomas Regnier noted that Huawei and ZTE have already been listed as high-risk vendors and are subject to a recommendation to exclude them from EU telecom infrastructure under the 5G Toolbox. He confirmed that CSA2 will extend the high-risk vendor framework from telecommunications into “strategic sectors,” including energy. Under the current funding ban — which targets entities owned or controlled by designated high-risk countries — Chinese-owned companies such as Huawei are covered by definition. When asked whether Huawei’s lobbying access to Commission meetings would be restricted, the Commission could not answer and committed to following up.

There is no single published regulation, directive, or formal decision text. The mechanism relies on existing EU Financial Regulation provisions that allow security-based conditions on funding — no new legislation was required.

Why This Matters for BESS

Most reporting has focused on solar inverters. But Commission documentation explicitly states that “Energy storage systems / Power Conversion Systems (PCS) are explicitly included” in the restriction, as confirmed by ESS News.

This directly impacts BESS projects that use integrated battery-and-PCS packages from Chinese suppliers. Many utility-scale and C&I energy storage projects in Europe rely on turnkey solutions where the PCS is bundled with battery modules from the same Chinese manufacturer. Under this ban, any project seeking EIB, EIF, or EBRD financing must either source the PCS separately from a non-restricted supplier or forgo EU funding.

According to the European Solar Manufacturing Council (ESMC), the cost premium for switching to European or allied-country inverters is below 2% for utility-scale projects, based on a January 2026 Wood Mackenzie analysis.

Scope and Definitions

Who is affected

The ban applies to entities owned or controlled by companies from the four designated high-risk countries. This is broader than country-of-manufacture:

  • A Chinese-owned company manufacturing PCS in Europe is still restricted
  • A European company with majority Chinese ownership is restricted
  • Joint ventures controlled by Chinese entities are restricted

Christoph Podewils, ESMC Secretary General, confirmed:

"It's really a strict regulation, without many loopholes. It also concerns inverters supplied from entities under control of the high-risk countries, so for instance, a company producing, in Europe, inverters belonging to a Chinese entity."
— Christoph Podewils, ESMC Secretary General (ESMC)

What is restricted

  • Solar inverters (string, central, micro)
  • Wind power converters
  • Energy storage PCS — explicitly included
  • All projects receiving EU funding — direct and indirect, including EIB, EIF, and EBRD
  • Projects in EU neighboring regions (North Africa, Western Balkans) connected to the EU grid
  • Horizon programme research collaboration involving these products

What is NOT restricted

  • Sub-components — power semiconductors (IGBTs, MOSFETs) and other components sourced from Chinese manufacturers and used inside European-made inverters are not covered
  • Battery cells and modules from Chinese suppliers (only the PCS/inverter is restricted)
  • Privately funded projects with no EU financing component
  • Projects using non-EU inverters from Japan, South Korea, USA, Taiwan, or other non-designated countries

Timeline

DateEvent
Dec 3, 2025EU Economic Security Doctrine (JOIN(2025) 977) flags solar inverters from Chinese suppliers as a "high-risk dependency"
Dec 29, 2025Coordinated cyberattack hits 30+ wind and solar farms in Poland — attributed to Russia's FSB (CERT Polska)
Jan 20, 2026Commission publishes CSA2 (Cybersecurity Act revision) proposal allowing future "high-risk vendor" designations — mirrors the 5G Toolbox approach
Feb 9, 2026EIB sends letter to European Council proposing dedicated financial support for EU inverter manufacturers (PV Tech)
Mar 2026Von der Leyen approves funding ban at department chiefs meeting (SCMP)
May 1, 2026Ban takes effect. Financial institutions notified. Deadline to report pipeline projects to the Commission
May 2, 2026Chinese Mission to the EU warns of countermeasures. Minister Suo Peng: "If the European side insists on passing these laws and treats Chinese enterprises in a discriminatory manner, China will be forced to take countermeasures"
May 4, 2026ESS News confirms PCS for battery energy storage is explicitly included in the ban
May 7, 2026China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issues formal statement rejecting the ban
Sep 1, 2026Grandfathering notification deadline — projects must submit exemption requests by this date
Nov 1, 2026Grandfathering approval deadline — only projects sufficiently mature for approval by this date qualify. Case-by-case decisions
Apr 15, 2027Phase-out deadline for high-risk inverters in non-EU-grid-connected projects
~2027CSA2 legislation expected to pass — would enable a full market ban (not just funding restrictions)

Projects seeking a grandfathering exemption must be sufficiently advanced for approval by November 1, 2026. Early-stage projects that could still switch suppliers will not qualify. Targeted derogations may be granted for delays exceeding one year or in cases of “overriding political or security considerations.”

The Cybersecurity Context

The ban did not emerge in isolation. It follows a series of national-level actions and a major cyberattack that accelerated the EU’s posture.

Poland — December 2025

On December 29, 2025, coordinated cyberattacks struck more than 30 wind and solar farms and a major combined heat and power plant in Poland. Attackers deployed destructive wiper malware, corrupted firmware, and deleted operating files. The attack disrupted communications but did not stop electricity production. CERT Polska attributed the attack to Russia’s FSB Center 16 unit (Static Tundra / Energetic Bear). The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a subsequent advisory.

National precedents

Several EU member states had already taken unilateral action:

  • Lithuania — Banned remote Chinese access to solar, wind, and storage devices (law passed November 2024, effective May 2025 for new installations, May 2026 for existing)
  • Czech Republic — National cybersecurity agency NUKIB warned that Chinese solar inverters are a potential security threat (September 2025)
  • Germany — Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) explicitly warned of “manipulation of energy infrastructure by manufacturers or third parties” in solar power systems

The 30 MEPs letter

Prior to the ban, 30 Members of the European Parliament — led by Bart Groothuis (Renew) and Miriam Lexmann (EPP) — sent an open letter to Executive Vice-Presidents Virkkunen and Jorgensen calling for “immediate and binding measures” to restrict high-risk solar inverter vendors from critical energy infrastructure.

Scale of Chinese market share

The restriction targets a significant share of the European market. According to Wood Mackenzie (January 2026), approximately 80% of PV inverters imported into the EU come from Chinese manufacturers. The SCMP reported that Huawei alone controls over 220 GW of Europe’s installed solar capacity. The EIB stated in its February 2026 letter that “over 90% of global solar inverter market share is dominated by Chinese suppliers.”

China’s Response

Beijing has responded through multiple channels, each escalating in tone.

Ministry of Commerce — May 7, 2026

MOFCOM issued a formal statement (People’s Daily):

"Without any concrete evidence, the EU has, for the first time, designated China as a so-called 'high-risk country.' This constitutes stigmatization against China and imposes unfair and discriminatory treatment on Chinese products."

MOFCOM warned the EU’s actions would “undermine mutual trust,” “damage bilateral economic and trade cooperation,” and “threaten the stability of China-EU and even global industrial and supply chains.” It stated China would “take measures to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises” but did not specify countermeasures.

Chinese Mission to the EU — May 2, 2026

Minister Suo Peng, Chief for Economic and Trade Affairs at the Chinese Mission to the EU, warned against the broader EU legislative push — specifically the CSA2 proposal and the Industrial Accelerator Act: “If the European side insists on passing these laws and treats Chinese enterprises in a discriminatory manner, China will be forced to take countermeasures.” He called the CSA2’s “non-technical risk” factors “subjective and arbitrary.”

China Chamber of Commerce to the EU

The CCCEU rejected “energy weaponization” allegations and warned that expanding restrictions “will raise market entry barriers and drive up electricity costs for European households and businesses.”

Huawei

Huawei accused the EU of “origin-based discrimination” violating fair trade principles and urged Brussels to apply “uniform cybersecurity standards to all suppliers” rather than country-of-origin restrictions.

What’s Still Unclear

Several aspects of the ban remain unresolved:

No formal regulation has been published
The Commission communicated this policy internally to financial institutions. There is no publicly available regulation text, directive, or formal decision document. The legal basis rests on existing EU Financial Regulation provisions that allow security-based conditions on funding. This creates uncertainty about the exact boundaries and enforcement mechanisms.
Sub-component sourcing is not addressed
European-manufactured inverters and PCS may source critical power semiconductors — IGBTs, MOSFETs, and other switching devices — from Chinese manufacturers. The current ban does not restrict sub-components, creating a potential compliance gap where the final product is nominally European but relies on Chinese supply chains for key parts.
Enforcement specifics for complex ownership structures
The ban covers entities "owned or controlled" by high-risk country entities, but the threshold for control is not publicly defined. Companies with minority Chinese investment, licensing agreements with Chinese firms, or joint ventures with complex governance structures may face ambiguity.
CSA2 would expand the ban beyond funded projects
The current restriction only affects EU-funded projects. Privately financed BESS projects using Chinese PCS are unaffected. However, the Cybersecurity Act revision (CSA2) — currently in trilogue negotiations with political agreement expected by early 2027 — would enable a full market ban on high-risk vendor equipment, not just a funding restriction. The proposed legislation includes fines of up to 7% of turnover for violations.

European BESS PCS Manufacturers

For BESS procurement teams evaluating alternatives, there are currently 10 European PCS manufacturers listed in the BESS Manufacturers directory:

ManufacturerCountryProfile
Hitachi EnergySwitzerlandView profile
Siemens EnergyGermanyView profile
SMA Solar TechnologyGermanyView profile
Power ElectronicsSpainView profile
IngeteamSpainView profile
FREQCONGermanyView profile
WSTECHGermanyView profile
FroniusAustriaView profile
Merus PowerFinlandView profile
MaxxenSwitzerlandView profile

The ESMC estimates EU inverter production capacity at over 100 GW per year, with an additional 45 GW of expansion planned by 2027. Western-manufactured capacity outside the EU adds another 26+ GW.

Non-EU, non-Chinese alternatives

BESS projects can also source PCS from manufacturers in countries not designated as high-risk:

ManufacturerCountryProfile
Nidec Industrial SolutionsJapanView profile
Hyosung Heavy IndustriesSouth KoreaView profile
EPC PowerUSAView profile
DynapowerUSAView profile
Delta ElectronicsTaiwanView profile

A full list of all PCS manufacturers — including Chinese suppliers unaffected in privately funded projects — is available on the PCS manufacturer directory page.

What Comes Next

The current ban is a funding restriction, not a market ban. EU-funded BESS projects must comply; privately funded projects are unaffected. This will change if CSA2 passes.

The Cybersecurity Act revision (CSA2), proposed January 20, 2026, would create a permanent framework for designating “high-risk vendors” and imposing binding restrictions — including potential bans from the EU market entirely, not just from funded projects. Executive VP Henna Virkkunen named solar inverters as a specific example when presenting the proposal.

CSA2 is in trilogue negotiations, with political agreement targeted for early 2027. If adopted, it would carry fines of up to 7% of turnover for violations.

For BESS procurement teams, the practical implication is clear: projects seeking any form of EU financing must now source PCS from European, Japanese, Korean, American, or other non-restricted manufacturers. Projects that may seek EU financing in the future — or that may be subject to CSA2 once enacted — should factor supplier origin into procurement decisions now.

Browse European PCS Manufacturers

Compare 10 European and 5 allied-country PCS suppliers for BESS projects — specs, datasheets, and company profiles.

View PCS Directory →

This situation is still developing

Grandfathering deadline: Sep 1. CSA2 trilogue: ongoing. Subscribe for updates as this story evolves.

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Sources

All sources cited in this article

EU primary documents

Industry associations

China's response

Reporting